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Any beginning is difficult. To begin to talk about Gilles Deleuze is 
particularly difficult. For one thing, he is a philosopher of immense 
learning which is tightly tied to his rich studies in French or European 
intellectual history. He confessed to Michel Cressole in his 1973 letter: “I 
belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less 
bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy… I myself ‘did’ 
history of philosophy for a long time, read books on this or that author” 
(Neg., p. 5-6). Indeed, this aspect of his learning is evident in any of his 
writings. Hence, for someone like me who had meager background in 
philosophy and in French literature, to start to read Deleuze was and still 
is a difficult endeavour. Secondly, Deleuze was an experimenter, a 
player [joueur]. Not only did he play with canonical works handed down 
from the past in the western philosophical tradition, ranging from his 
earlier studies on and with work of Hume, Nietzsche, then Kant, 
Bergson, Spinoza, and later Leibniz (in the order of his related 
publications), but he also experimented with thinking beyond the 
traditional boarders of philosophy. In his own words, he “compensated 
in various ways” (Neg., p. 5-6) in finding new rules to philosophizing. In 
this effort, he drew sources from and critiqued in the domain of 
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psychoanalysis, literature (most notably Proust, Sacher-Masoch and 
Kafka) as well as other areas of the arts, such as painting, theatre and 
cinema. And it is precisely from these works of “assemblage” traversing 
intellectual disciplines and artistic domains that Deleuze drew himself an 
immense “cartography” and conjured up many refreshing images of 
thought throughout his life. I began to read Deleuze by pure chance in a 
classroom during my exchange in France. 
One cannot intend to read Deleuze’s work; one encounters it in the 
middle. And this is the best approach, according to Deleuze, “what is 
interesting is the middle” (Dial., p. 29), in the middle of things, in the 
middle of worlds. So, let’s forget about what we were reading before, 
what questions were on our mind; forget about what we plan to do – and 
what answers we can expect – just suspending ourselves in this 
deliciously luxurious cloud of ignorance. Forget everything. Know 
nothing. We are in a foreign territory… 
Suppose you happen to turn to page 27 in Deleuze’s Dialogues II with 
the chapter title: “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature”, and 
you read the first few lines: “To leave, to escape, is to trace a line. The 
highest aim of literature, according to Lawrence, is ‘to leave, to leave, to 
escape … to across the horizon, enter into another life… It is thus that 
Melville finds himself in the middle of the Pacific. He has really crossed 
the line of the horizon.’ The line of flight is a deterritorialization.” We are 
literally in the middle of Deleuzian thought. Dialogues II is a book 
composed by Deleuze with his former student and then colleague Claire 
Parnet, originally published in France in 1977. As Deleuze explained in 
his preface to the English edition, this is a book written between the two 
well-known books that he co-wrote with Félix Guattari, namely: Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateau. In his own words, the ‘between’-ness of 
this book is not only between two books written between two persons – 
Deleuze himself and Guattari – there is also the ‘offshoot’ of his 
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conversation between himself and Parnet, a “new line-between.”  A little 
further down the chapter, we encounter a rather striking passage: 
 
The English and the Americans do not have the same way 
of beginning again as the French. French beginning again 
is the tabula rasa, the search for a primary certainty as a 
point of origin, always the point of anchor. The other way 
of beginning again, on the other hand, is to take up the 
interrupted line, to join a segment to the broken line, to 
make it pass between two rocks in a narrow gorge, or over 
the top of the void, where it had stopped. It is never the 
beginning or the end which are interesting; the beginning 
and end are points. What is interesting is the middle. The 
English zero is always in the middle. Bottlenecks are 
always in the middle. Being in the middle of a line is the 
most uncomfortable position. One begins again through 
the middle… Trees are the opposite of grass. Not only 
does grass grow in the middle of things, but it grows itself 
through the middle… Grass has its line of flight, and does 
not take root. We have grass in the head, not a tree: what 
thinking signifies is what the brain is, a ‘particular 
nervous system’ of grass. (Dial., p. 29-30) 
 
Now, if we could go back to the enigmatic beginning line mentioned 
earlier: “To leave, to escape, is to trace a line… The line of flight is a 
deterritorialization.” (p. 27) What strikes us so far? What has been 
repeated? A few words haunt us, “line”, “middle”, “beginning”, “point”, 
“zero”, “broken”, “flight”, “leave”, “horizon”, “trees”, “grass”, even the 
notion of “English” versus “French”. What does it all mean? Before we 
can make any meaning at all out of the text, we observe a few things: 
First of all, he seems to be distinguishing two different ways of 
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beginning: There is the French beginning, “the search for a primary 
certainty as a point of origin”. Then there is the English way of starting at 
“zero”, but then this “zero” is not at all a tracing-back of “origin”, as he 
says “the English zero is always in the middle”. A zero in the middle! A 
mathematical coordinate is the only image I know that seems to 
exemplify this paradox of a “middle zero” that one can place anywhere 
in the space. So it’s not about getting from point A to point B with any 
pre-determined manner. In fact, this B could well be an unknown, or 
better be an unknown. So unlike the French search for roots in the 
manner of a tree, this middle zero is an English beginning that picks up a 
broken line in the middle and takes a flight to escape, to cross the 
horizon that’s already in view, to leave for somewhere else, somewhere 
not yet known. In a manner of grass, not only does it spring up in the 
middle of a path, it also unearths itself with the fateful wind, only to 
show up in the middle of somewhere again. So to trace a “line of flight” 
as such, Deleuze calls “deterritorialization”.  
We realize suddenly that Deleuze is thinking in geographic terms 
with botanic metaphors. Indeed, for Deleuze, “To fly is to trace a line, 
lines, a whole of cartography. One only discovers worlds through a long, 
broken flight” (p. 27). [Carto-] in the French etymologic dictionary 
indicates an origin from Latin [charta], which has branched into one of its 
meanings as the “first element of learned act of composing”. The base [-
graphy], is connected with the word [greffe], a member of the family of the 
Greek [graphein] to mean writing. Interestingly, even the word 
cartography, is a crossing of paths between a Latin root and a Greek 
base. I don’t know if Deleuze defines cartography somewhere, but it 
seems to me that cartography could well be a trace /inscription/writing 
that is left behind in the process of deterritorialization. Or, the act of 
deterritorialization could well be called a process of mapping, the 
making of cartography. So we see that a cartography gives an image of a 
horizontal surface, whereas, a genealogy (of tree, of family, for instance) 
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gives an image of a vertical transcendence from the depth of the roots to 
the branches high above.  
Deleuze employs these image-like conceptual terms in the context of 
comparative literature between French and English. Through an 
illustration of various Anglo-American authors’ works such as D.H. 
Lawrence, Hermann Melville, Francis Scott Fitzgerald, Virginia Woolf, 
Jack Kerouac and Henry Miller, he suggests that their writing constantly 
shows ruptures that exemplify the process of what he calls 
deterritorialization, for in them “everything is departure, becoming, 
passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside” (p. 27). But clearly 
Deleuze does not write about the superiority of English literature for the 
sake of writing it, since for a French philosopher, English literature could 
well be an outside at least in two senses: outside of the country, outside 
of his discipline. One could say that Deleuze encounters an “English 
zero” through English literature for it serves for him as a new terrain for 
a beginning of thought. In so doing, he becomes the kind of 
(philosopher)-“nomad” that he himself calls for, since as nomads, “they 
have no history, they only have geography” (p. 23). Hence it is not 
surprising to see that this long conversation with Parnet in the form of a 
book dwells on diverse topics (i.e. thought-demanding geographies): not 
only on the terrain of English literatures but also on others such as 
psychoanalysis, politics and so on.2 
 
But Deleuze’s penchant for new beginnings showed itself quite early 
on. In one of his earlier yet very important works, The Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze had dedicated one series (#18) to sketch out three images of 
philosophers.3 What are these images of philosophers about? Why sketch 
them? You may wonder, as I did. Ultimately for Deleuze, the tracing 
back of three kinds of images of philosophers is itself not merely an 
philosophical activity digging into history, but an attempt to sketch an 
orientation, which already supports his idea that “thought itself 
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presupposes axes and according to which it develops, that it has a 
geography before having a history, and that it traces dimensions before 
constructing systems” (LS, p. 127). And even though we modern 
educators don’t tend to think it necessary to learn about the history of 
philosophy, be it Western or Eastern, as it is outside of our discipline as 
such, yet it is a propitious moment to learn a bit of basic knowledge of 
the western trajectory in philosophy, so as to better understand the 
highly-metaphorized images of philosophers that Deleuze has brought 
forth in his text. Also in so doing, some essential characteristics that 
associate with these images will also come to the fore and will provide a 
ground for further discussion on Deleuze’s own “style” in 
philosophizing. 
Platonism is the best-known image of philosophy because of its long 
history since the Greek Academy to its persisting domination in Western 
societies. Plato presented Socrates as the ideal embodiment of 
philosophy; hence Platonism is often called Socratic philosophy. It is 
Socrates, the inventor of dialectics, who reasoned rigorously often 
through argumentative strategies employed and taught by the Sophists 
in Greek antiquity. And dialectics has been the platonic method par 
excellence in the linage of western philosophy, although it passed its 
own development through later well-known philosophers such as 
Descartes, Kant, Hegel. In this image, the philosopher is a being of 
ascents and is the one who leaves the cave and rises up. 
However, following Nietzsche, Deleuze is profoundly dissatisfied 
with the Platonic orientation toward height. They see Socratic 
philosophers and their successors as tragic thinkers with Platonic wings 
striving for heights of transcendence. He considers them to be tragic for 
their “degeneracy” in philosophy from the pre-Socratics and regards the 
enterprise of philosophy since Plato as a sad dream that tries too hard to 
distinguish – the “True” (philosophers)” from the “False” (sophists), “the 
Original” from “copies” – “the High” from “the Low”, “Soul” from 
Thinking like Grass, with Deleuze in Education? 
LING 
 37 
“body” – a whole series of splitting that essentially treats the body as an 
abject or at least not worthy of attention. 
It was Nietzsche who plunged into the depths of history and dug out 
the pre-Socratics and found another image of philosophers that is much 
closer to his taste. The so-called pre-Socratics were early Greek thinkers 
who were active back in the sixth century B.C. They were concerned with 
cosmological questions in the style of so-called “natural philosophy” 
(physiologia), which is named for their close tie with the observable world 
by the concept of physis (nature), and for their stress on a basic 
uniformity of behavior in the natural world. Heraclitus and Parmenides 
(both are the Eleatics) in particular, were concerned with the problem of 
unity and diversity of the universe. What they differ from Platonism in 
philosophizing is their attachment to immediate experiences in the 
concrete and changing world. This ancient gesture of philosophizing, a 
mode of thought or a style of life, might be called a vitalistic approach to 
philosophy.  
Essentially it’s of the depth, as Deleuze characterizes it to be a 
philosophy with “a hammer-blow” and with “Empedocles’ lead 
sandals”. Here, the hammer-blow is referring to these pre-Socratics who 
philosophized with a “hammer”, “the hammer of the geologist and 
speleologist” for they thought, unlike the Platonism after them, in the 
depth of life, “inside the caverns”.  (LS, 128) Empedocles is taken as the 
epitome of such philosophers who plunged in the earthiness of life to 
contemplate the cosmos, seeking it the secret of water and fire, for 
instance. Empedocles’ lead (or bronze, according to different authors) 
sandal has simply become a metonymic object for his way of 
philosophizing, which coincides with their anecdotes of life.4  
Yet, for Deleuze there is another image of philosophers that draws 
most of his interests. It’s with those “third Greeks” in their way of 
philosophizing that Deleuze sees an image of the surface. What Deleuze 
refers to here are the Cynics and the Stoics. With them, Deleuze finds a 
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“curious system of provocation” where they respond people’s questions 
by giving them a blow with their staff, if not with silences. In the case of 
the Cynics, although claiming a Socratic lineage, they are not the 
“theoretic man” that Nietzsche calls the Socratics to be. Their primary 
interests are ethical. The most illustrious example is Diogenes of Sinope. 
He fervently rejects convention [nomos] as to show its arbitrariness or the 
unreasonableness of the Athenian social norms. He is a harsh critic of 
Plato for his metaphysical pursuits or any theoretical ethics. The 
legendary interchange with Alexander the Great suffices to sketch his 
character: When Alexander identified himself to Diogenes of Sinope by 
saying “I’m Alexander the Great King”, he responds with his own 
“position”, “I am Diogenes the Cynic” which literally means “Diogenes 
the Dog”. So, what does Deleuze see in these practices of the Cynic, if not 
the humorous yet daring ability to beat the hidden assumptions and 
attitudes out of people’s lives onto the surface, taking the freedom of 
speech or frankness [parrhēsia] to be their violent and merciless staff. The 
Stoics represented by Chrysippus also sneer against Plato in their 
attempt to unseat the Ideas, but to show that “the incorporal is not high 
above (en hauteur), but is rather at the surface, that it is not the highest 
cause but the superficial effect par excellence, and that it is not Essence 
but event.” (LS, p. 130) Hence, both the Cynics and the Stoics display a 
kind of what Deleuze names as “staff-blow philosophy (Philosophie à coup 
de baton)”, in which their philosophical values are new; their “new logos” 
are “animated with paradox”; and their philosophical anecdotes are no 
longer Platonic nor pre-Socratic (p. 130), reside neither in nature (physis) 
nor in conventions (nomos). They philosophize laterally from the event of 
life, from the East, where the dawn of day begins anew (p. 129).  
Since Hercules is the ultimate hero of the Stoic thought “in his dual 
battle against both depth and height” and symbolizes a “reorientation of 
the entire thought and a new geography”, Deleuze’s image of the third 
philosopher is becoming clear: it’s about the “reversible cloak of 
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Hercules with his club and lion skin” (p. 132).  This is the image no 
longer of Empedocles/Dionysus down below, nor of Socrates/Apollo up 
above, but of Diogenes the Cynic/Hercules of the surface.  And as if 
these metonymic as well as metaphoric images of thought were not 
enough to characterize the main differences among the three orientations 
of philosophy, Deleuze goes further. With a clin d’oeil, he associates 
Platonic conversion with manic-depressive, pre-Socratics subversion 
with schizophrenia, and calls this new philosophical operation 
“perversion” (which he seems to link along with masochism elsewhere). 
And here Deleuze specifies that “perversion implies an extraordinary art 
of surfaces.” (p. 133) 
To describe it in one broad stroke then, the three images of 
philosophers were the result of Deleuze’s surveying [survoler] through 
the pre-Socratics, Platonism, then taking up Stoics’ initiative to finally 
reconfigure a third image: philosopher of the surface. Indeed it is here 
we have a glimpse of Deleuze’s general maneuver of orientation as a 
philosopher from the vertical to the horizontal, from the depth and 
height to the surface, from the points of beginning or end to the middle, 
from the temporal (past, present, future) to the spatial (the plane of 
consistency, plan of immanence). Clearly, Deleuze himself, the 
contemporary philosopher takes on the persona of Hercules, turning 
towards a philosophical diversion, a “perverse” straying away, a 
deterritorialization that he already lived with before his eventual naming 
of this term.  
 
For Deleuze, philosophy is not in the nature of a “doxical” return but 
a paradoxical one for it attempts to articulate something outside the 
order of the dominant opinion or proposition (WP, p. 80). Following 
Nietzsche’s “monstrous” attempt to revolutionize the traditional 
approach to philosophy which is a rational and systematic kind of critical 
thinking about the general nature of the world, Deleuze traced the 
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history of philosophy traversing his “enemies” and/or “allies” to re-
imagine a new image of thought, to reorient philosophy itself. And if the 
classical philosophy can be said to be “thinking about thinking”, 
Deleuze’s work can be seen in the question of how that “thinking about” 
comes about in the first place. In this long search, he has come to realize 
that the history of philosophy in fact has played a repressive role in 
thought, easily demonstrated in an authoritative voice in its reproach: 
“how can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and 
Heidegger, and so-and-so’s book about them?” Deleuze must have felt 
this voice coming from an imaginary yet existing fatherly figure of 
philosophy as he studied it. Deleuze thinks that it’s precisely this kind of 
weighty malaise that prevents people from truly entering the gate to a 
thinking-otherwise (Dial., p.10).  
So in precisely this sense, Deleuze’s philosophy is strangely “non-
philosophical”, it is counter-“doxography”, for it relinquishes the 
clinging to the dialectic discourse in its transcendence to “Truth”, as well 
as the Moral Image of thought which concerned philosophers such as 
Descartes, Kant or Hegel, great “philosophical laborers” as Nietzsche 
would call them. Since the time of his radical critique of this traditional 
Image in The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
continued to embark on his line of flight to create philosophical concepts 
under new conditions that are, not only a departure from but “a rigorous 
struggle against this Image, which it would denounce as non-
philosophical” (DR, p.132). To approach philosophy in a kind of non-
philosophical way, Deleuze truly begins to think the unthought in “a 
thought without image”, with a kind of “philosophical obstinacy with no 
ally but paradox, one which would have to renounce both the form of 
representation and the element of common sense” (DR, p.132).5  
In the last collaborative work with Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari give a “brand” to their philosophy, 
“Geophilosophy”. As a philosopher, Deleuze has always been concerned 
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with thinking, yet rather than digging into what thinking is as ontology 
of the traditional metaphysics, he is more concerned with the question of 
how one comes to think, how to create concepts in a plane of immanence. 
Philosophizing in this sense is then a process of reterritorialization on the 
terrain of concepts in a “milieu of immanence” that requires the 
development of a particular mode of deterritorialization (WP, 85-88). 
Concepts imply “only neighborhoods and connections on the horizon” 
according to a “synthetic and contingent principle – an encounter, a 
conjunction” (WP, p. 93). Indeed it was David Hume’s empiricism 
inspired him to take a decisive step in favoring the conjunction over 
ontology, that is, replacing the IS with AND, valuing the nth power for a 
relation with “AND…AND…AND…” It’s a philosophy of becoming; a 
becoming of a philosopher; a philosopher in becoming.  
As such, philosophical activity, for Deleuze, is not different from 
other creative acts such as writing, music making or painting. “Art 
thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and 
percepts” (WP, p. 66), he says, whereas philosophy thinks on a plane of 
immanence and makes concepts on a principle of contingent reason (WP, 
p. 93). It is all a question of tracing the line, which is already pre-
philosophy. Indeed for him, philosophy is something paradoxical and 
inherently so, something that mingles between the (traditionally-
speaking) philosophical and the non-philosophical. His own new 
direction of approaching philosophy is “without” direction: it is 
something created from encountering the outside, outside of the 
established domain of philosophy. At the same time, while wanting to 
get out of traditional philosophy, Deleuze finds himself expanding 
within it, with all the fresh topological figures and metaphorical concepts 
as his companions, such as: geophilosophy, geoliterature, cartography, 
and so on. But not only the Deleuzian geophilosophy is paradoxical in 
the sense of dwelling in the tension between what is doxa and what is 
non-doxa, it is also para-doxical in the more literal sense of the prefix, 
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para- being understood etymologically in its geographical and dynamic 
dimension, as “beside, past, or beyond”: a para- movement of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It is a constant play of the 
inside and the outside, resulting in an expansion of multiplicity within 
philosophy.  
 
By opening up for himself a philosophical desert to be populated 
through this process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, a 
beginning in the middle of the unknown territory, Deleuze insists on this 
mysterious relationship between the dimension of the unknown and that 
of the faithful and creative act of philosophizing, that which is stretched 
to the nth power, to infinity. The overwhelming number of lively 
concepts produced in any of his works and the lightening-speed 
movements with which he created them attest to this point. Interestingly, 
and maybe not surprisingly, reading Deleuze’s work feels very much 
like reading his own learning experiences, except that instead of being 
given concrete accounts of them in dramatic or historical manner, we see 
that he makes all his learning encounters into events, creating concepts, 
projecting them onto a philosophical surface, making his experiences, in 
his own conception, “impersonal” and “incorporeal”. He has traced all 
his learning trajectories or lines of flights into forming a cartography in a 
plane of immanence that is inundated with new images of thought. 
Perhaps that is what he means by saying that “a book of philosophy 
should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a 
kind of science fiction” (DR, p.xx). By detective novel, he means that 
concepts are called upon (in the sense of being created at hand) to 
“resolve local situations” with their “zone of presence”. And these 
concepts change along with the problems. By science fiction, he means a 
tracing-out of a world where “individuations are impersonal, and 
singularities are pre-individual: the splendor of the pronoun ‘one’”; 
Erewhon, “signifying at once the originary ‘nowhere’ and the displaced 
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disguised, modified and always re-created ‘here-and-now’. (DR, p. xxi) 
To philosophize in this sense is to become nomads, as Deleuze suggests. 
Since nomads need a desert to begin, a geophilosophic thinking is then to 
populate a moving desert that one constantly makes through the 
encounter with outside. Evidently, in this endeavour, whether one is 
physically traveling or not is of no importance, for what is to be 
deterritorialized is the thinker-in-becoming.  
Indeed, throughout his philosophical life, Deleuze sought many 
outsiders for thinking with others, with other disciplines or geographies. 
For him, as he did, to lead a life is to become, to become what one is not 
yet. To illustrate more concretely with one of his images of 
philosophizing, it is to release oneself into the function of the “co-
functioning” of the “symbiosis”, “sympathy”, and perhaps symphony 
also. He says, “There is no need for philosophy: it is necessarily 
produced where each activity gives rise to its line of deterritorialization. 
To get out of philosophy, to do never mind what so as to be able to 
produce it from outside.” (Dial., p. 55)  
Then, what could Deleuze mean to the field of Education? My first 
temptation is to simply boldly borrow his phrase above and to propose 
thus: There is no need for education: it is necessarily produced where each 
activity gives rise to its line of deterritorialization. To get out of education, to 
do never mind what so as to be able to produce it from outside! Perhaps, it is 
indeed a Deleuzian repetition6  that we can aim for in education, a kind of 
repetition that is a transgression, in which its possibility hinges on 
opposing as much to moral(nomos) law as to natural (physis) law (DR, p. 
2-3). By working in opposition to the order of the always already-existing 
laws, in the spirit of parrhēsia prefigured by Diogenes the Cynic, Deleuze 
is proposing new possibilities of working in the direction of creating 
artistic realities; that is, to treat philosophy itself as an artistic endeavour 
in its essential nature. And if one is to realize the fundamental role that 
education plays in forming our frames of thinking, that is, providing 
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existing and always the dominant images of thought of our society in 
general, the relevance of Deleuze’s analysis and his “anecdotes” of 
philosophizing is hard to deny. Or, at least we are tempted to make this 
parallel: that if philosophy can be made fecund with the open-
mindedness of an artist, then the work of education can also be made 
fertile through the exigency of treating it as an artistic engagement, 
something that not only demands creativity but more importantly a 
critical consciousness of the ethical dimension that is inherent in 
education.  
To do that concretely, perhaps one thing is to be recognizant of the 
dogmatic images of thought in the history of knowledge heavily 
critiqued in Deleuze’s works, so as to facilitate our own process of 
deterritorialization out of the “comfort” zones that these entrenched 
images of thought often provide and perpetuate through the dominant 
discourses which in turn manifest themselves in curricula at various 
levels in the field of education. Also, keeping in mind not only the 
concrete objections that Deleuze raises regarding the obstinate presence 
of the doxa in its various forms, but also his own encounters with his 
outside-of-philosophy, of making them events of thinking, we, who are 
interested in the territory of education, can begin to ask some questions: 
For instance, what does it mean to attempt to bring Deleuze’s work from 
the “outside” in the proximity of our educational realm, or rather, to 
extend our ignorance to the edge of the inter-disciplinary borders, to 
think about curriculum questions with his diverse philosophical 
thinking? If one takes curriculum to mean something akin to a wall or a 
back-bone to the structure of educational system, how could one 
approach it in such a way that allows the multiplicities in the creative 
work of education come to the fore, to “pierce the wall” of curriculum 
itself, or, to make it porous? What might be the exigencies on us 
educators ourselves in this kind of attempt? If the attempt to make 
deterritorialization in the field of education indeed demands a 
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becoming-nomad of the educator, what do we need to prepare ourselves 
for that kind of line of flight into the desert of our own ignorance? How 
do we populate it with the children of our own event in meeting say, 
Deleuzian works? And ultimately, what kind of experiments of thought 
could one have in the theory of learning, in this regard? How does one 
begin again and again, like a refrain, where each repetition already 
signifies an artistic singularity? 
In fact, these Deleuze-spirited questions are not meant to be met with 
any definite answers, strategies or plan of actions; they are simply a kind 
of carte postal or maybe more appropriately, a carte d’invitation, or even a 
carte de visite that is slipped into the crack of the door of anyone who is 
curious enough to respond to its call, not at all aiming at a carte-réponse, 
but maybe a cart(e)o-graphie of her own that draws out a new territory of 




1. I italicize the prepositions here to indicate the special attention to which 
Deleuze often pays for bringing out the dynamic forces that they bring in the 
matter of thinking; they could be regarded also as small linguistic device to 
strike certain resonance with the kind of geographic philosophizing that 
Deleuzian engages in his work, stand in tension with the default fixity of 
representation. The “in” of “in Education” ostensibly refers to the situated-ness 
of this thinking exercise within the terrain of Education; yet, this “in” can 
paradoxically signals an “out” or “outside” that I attempt here “with” Deleuze. 
As such, I place a subtle tension that readers may recognize only after reading 
the whole text, for it is facilitated by an encounter with Deleuze’s concept such 
as “deterritorialization”, which is what I am trying to introduce here. “With” 
then stresses the possibility of thinking along with Deleuze’s creative (images) 
of thought; to be in flight with him through a process of deterritorialization of 
reading. Reading here not only refers to reading into the contents as concepts, 
ideas, (i.e. representations of knowledge), but even more so into his creative way 
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of thinking shown by his style of writing (numerous metaphors, for example) as 
well as his “anecdotes” of living in philosophy. The “like” serving as a 
preposition evidently signifies a simile to convey the possibility of having one’s 
thinking unroots itself, be blown away and then reroots again in a different 
territory, imitating the way that grass do to populate any crake of fertile land. 
The use of “a” is hence deliberately used to emphasis both the general ability 
and the singularity of each rooting of grass.  
2. Concerning Deleuze’s work in the intersection between literature and 
philosophy, a very large volume of collected works in French is published under 
the title Deleuze et les écrivains: littérature et philosophie, edited by Bruno Gelas and 
Hervé Micolet (Nantes, Édition Cécile Defaut, 2007). This is probably the most 
comprehensive collection to date that examines and celebrates the work of 
Deleuze, in which forty-two contributors have come together in one single 
volume; among them are prominent philosophers, writers, poets, as well as 
artists. A complete bibliography of Deleuze’s work can also be found in this 
collection. 
3. The Logic of Sense is Deleuze’s accompanying book to his doctoral dissertation 
that is published under the book title Difference and Repetition (see bibliography). 
The form that this “minor” (in a Deleuzian sense, it is far from the common 
meaning of “less”) book takes is rather unusual (for a contemporary 
professional philosopher at least), for it was written in series with thirty-four 
themes or sub-titles and lengthy appendices. In fact, one could almost read it 
like a collection of short stories! But the decisive form that this book takes, along 
with its multiple way of thinking, marks Deleuze the philosopher his own 
creative path to thinking. 
4.  According to the legend recorded by Diogenes Laërtius, Empedocles 
perished by throwing himself into the volcanic flames on Mount Etna in Sicily 
and died at the age of sixty. It is as if this last anecdote of his glorious life and 
the literal illustration of his commitment into the depth of life, i.e. the earth, 
were indeed intended by Empedocles to convince his disciples of his 
immortality by making disappear of his physical body. Yet, one of his metallic 
(be it lead or bronze) sandals was thrown back to the surface of the earth. In this 
case, one could either interpret it as an evidence of Empedocles’ deceit; or 
otherwise, consider it as an enigmatic sign that he indeed has come back as “a 
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god among men” after being devoured by the fire. However symbolic this 
return to the earth as a divine might be, this latter interpretation seems to adhere 
to Empedocles’ view of the cyclic reincarnation of the mortals. He himself 
though, has exited out of that cycle – only the sandal remained as a messenger 
to tell of his immortal return.  
5. American scholar Gregg Lambert has written an extensive book on the 
various aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy of non-philosophy, appropriately titled: 
The Non-philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, New York: Continuum, 2002. 
6. As the concept of “repetition” with Deleuze is central in his book Repetition 
and Difference (1994/1968), it is here worthwhile to cite a few fragments to help 
understand its singular meaning:  
“Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concern non-exchangeable and 
non-substitutable singularities.” (RD, p. 1) 
“The repetition of a work of art is like a singularity without concept, and it is not 
by chance that a poem must be learned by heart. The head is the organ of 
exchange, but the heart is the amorous organ of repetition. (DR. p.1-2) 
“If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against the 
law: against the similar form and the equivalent content of law. … If repetition 
exists, it expresses at once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality 
opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneity 
opposed to variation and an eternity opposed to permanence. In every respect, 
repetition is a transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or 
general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic reality. ” (emphasis 
mine, DR, p. 2-3.) 
7. To translate these Cartes into English: Carte-postal, post card; carte d’invitation, 
invitation card; carte-de-visite, visiting card, a kind of note that the French used 
to use to leave at the door of the person one desire to see but who is absent for 
the time being, which is also used as wishing card that accompanies a gift; carte-
réponse, answering-card; cart(e)-o-graphie, cartography, which means the art of 
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